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Judicial Review of Risk Assessment Science
April 2000,
Sri Melethil
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I. Introduction 2-3
II. Fundamentals of Risk Assessment Science 3-8
A. Definition and Explanation of Terms
B. Human Epidemiological Studies
1. Cohort Studies
2. Case Control Studies
C. Animal studies
1. Introduction
2. Dose-Response (High-Dose) Studies
3. Determination of Low- Dose Effects
III. Judicial Review 9-22
A. "Best Available Science" Standard
B. "Significant Risk/Substantial Evidence" Standard
C. Model Selection: Threshold versus No-Threshold
D. Opinion of Scientist is Not Scientific Evidence
E. Adequate Evidence is Needed
F. Animal Data Acceptable to Decide Human Carcinogenicity
G. Validity of Method used for Chemical Analysis
IV. Solutions for Effective Risk Assessment 23-25
V. Endnotes 25-28
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I. INTRODUCTION
Administrative agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
and the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) are required
under statutory mandate to protect people from the risk of toxic substances
found in the work place and the environment. Risk assessment may be defined
as the scientific or quasi-scientific basis these agencies use to determine
health risk of an environmental chemical. The subsequent promulgation,
after a chemical is found to be toxic, of new rules or modification of
existing rules in order make the work place or the environment safe from
this chemical may be termed risk management. However, there are significant
knowledge gaps in this area, resulting in scientific controversies. From
a legal standpoint, courts are often required to decide conflicts in the
area of risk assessment, many of which are based on different interpretations
of scientific data. This litigation involves analysis of highly technical
and scientific information. For example, in the case involving setting
exposure standards for ethylene oxide, notice and comment resulted in
1600 pages of transcript and 300 exhibits. (1)
Therefore, it is important to understand how scientific issues have influenced
court decisions in the area of risk assessment.
The overall objective of this report is to provide the reader with
an overview of important scientific fundamentals involved in risk assessment
of toxic chemicals, especially carcinogens, and how the courts have relied
on knowledge of science to decide environmental disputes between private
entities and federal agencies. The specific objectives of this review
are (1) to provide the reader with a brief summary of procedures used
to determine whether a chemical is a carcinogen (2) to discuss important
statutory scientific standards, (3) to critically examine judicial review
of the scientific concepts and methods presented to the court by the agencies
and parties challenging agency rules and (4) to suggest solutions to minimize
non-beneficial health safety regulation. It should be noted that it is
beyond the scope of this review to discuss the validity of scientific
data presented to the Court; it is assumed that data presented were acquired
using acceptable scientific methods and procedures.
II. FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK ASSESSMENT SCIENCE
A. Definition and Explanation of Terms
1. Pharmacokinetics: may be defined as the study of " the concentration
in target organs and the interaction of a biologically active agent with
putative sites of action (2)
2. Power: is a statistical concept, which quantifies the ability
of a study to detect an excess risk that truly exists
(3).
3. Cohort means group
4. Epidemiology: The study of the prevalence and spread of disease
in a community (4)
5. Toxicology: The science of poisons - their source, chemical composition,
action, tests and antidotes (5)
6. ppm: parts per million
7. One hit hypothesis: This theory states that even a single molecule
of a hazardous chemical can interact with a molecule of DNA causing a
mutation which can then lead to cancer over the years. The linear (no-threshold)
models (described later) subscribe to this theory.
8. Maximum tolerated dose (MTD) can be defined as "a dose as high
as possible without shortening the animals' lives from non-carcinogenic
toxic effects (6)
B. Human Epidemiological Studies
(7)
Cancer risk from exposure to a hazardous chemical, found in the
environment or the work place is determined from human data and/or animal
studies. Results from these studies are analyzed to determine whether
environmental or work-place exposure to an agent can cause an increase
in the incidence of a health condition (e.g. cancer, birth defects etc).
The best way to obtain such data is from "well designed" epidemiological
studies, which can be classified as (1) cohort studies or (2) case-control
studies. The objectives of these studies are to obtain direct evidence
of a possible link between exposure to a particular chemical and a given
disease. As will be discussed, these studies have many weaknesses which
led the Occupational Safety and Health Administration to comment '"Although
the epidemiological method can provide evidence of a causal relationship
between exposure and disease in the case of positive findings, it is by
its very nature relatively crude and an insensitive. OSHA's policy when
evaluating negative studies [is] to hold them to higher standards of methodological
accuracy." (8). The following details will enable
the reader to appreciate the basis of OSHA's concerns about such studies.
The example of a work place pollutant, suspected of causing cancer, is
used to briefly illustrate the two types of study designs.
1. Cohort studies: A group of workers from the contaminated work
place (the "experimental" group) and a group of subjects who is not exposed
to this chemical (the control group) are selected on specific criteria.
No member of either group has been diagnosed with the disease in question.
Investigators then follow the subjects in both groups to see how many
in each group develop the disease over time. A finding that more subjects
in the experimental group develop the disease (e.g. cancer) would support,
but not prove, the hypothesis that the chemical in question is a risk
factor. Understandably, higher the frequency of cancer in the experimental
group, higher the risk from this chemical. Some critical issues, such
as selection of the members of the experimental and control groups, statistical
methods to calculate the number of subjects in each group, the duration
of the study and analysis and interpretation of the results do not find
universal consensus among scientists.
These studies provide prospective toxicity data under more controlled
conditions than case control studies (discussed next). However, there
are many practical problems in conducting such a study. Important among
them are: (1) these studies are expensive because (a) they require a large
number of subjects and (b) given the long latency period for cancer (5-50
years) (9), the duration of the study often takes
many years and (2) study dropout rate is high due to job relocation and
other similar convenience issues. The long duration of such studies also
raises ethical issues of exposing subjects to suspected carcinogens for
extended periods in the workplace. Therefore, it is not surprising that
epidemiological data is available only for a very small number of chemicals.
(10)
2. Case control studies: Such studies, which are retrospective
in nature, involve the identification of one group where members have
been diagnosed with the disease in question ("cases") and another group
in which no member has the disease ("controls"). Then, the number of workers
from the hazardous work environment is identified in each group. As in
a cohort study, a finding that more subjects in disease group worked in
the hazardous environment, would support, again not prove, the argument
that there is a connection the work place and the disease. Case control
studies also offer the advantage that it provides direct estimates of
relative risk. In addition, the required sample size is relatively small;
such studies are less expensive to conduct and especially suited to study
rare diseases (11). On the other hand, careful diagnosis
is required to ensure a proper representative control group is selected.
Sometimes, subjects may have been exposed to more than one risk factor
as in rubber workers who are exposed to "vinyl chloride, polychlorinated
biphenyls, chloroprene, selenium compounds, benzidine and its salts, aniline,
carbon tetrachloride and benzene " which are suspected or federal carcinogens
(12). It is therefore, not possible, at times to identify which is
the causative agent and develops appropriate safety measures.
C. Animal studies:
1. Introduction:
Animal studies are the most frequently method used by the regulatory
agencies to assess the risk of toxicity, particularly carcinogenicity,
of a given chemical to human (13). This
popularity stems from the advantages that animal studies offer. Firstly,
there is strong scientific support for the fact that most substances that
are carcinogenic in one mammalian species also induces cancer in other
species (14)
. Secondly, the pathology of development of tumors in a variety
of species resembles that in humans (15). Therefore,
animal data is a reasonable alternative to human epidemiological data
(16). In general, animal studies are, as might be
expected, also considerably less expensive than human epidemiological
studies.
2. Dose-Response (High Dose) Studies
A well-designed animal study would involve three, sometimes four,
groups of animals with about 50 animals per group (17).
These groups are as follows; (1) control group (no exposure) (2) an experimental
group fed the maximum tolerated dose, MTD (3) an experimental fed one-half
the MTD and (4) sometimes, an extra group with one-fourth the MTD. These
studies usually last about 1 to 2 years. Cancer incidence in the four
groups is then analyzed statistically to conclude if the chemical is a
carcinogen.
3. Determination of low-dose effects
The next step, the most controversial from a scientific stand point,
is to predict the existence of the smallest dose, if any, below which
the chemical is not carcinogenic. The determination of such "low-dose
effects" of the chemical is based on extrapolation of results from the
higher doses used in the study. The proper extrapolation technique (or
mathematical model) to use is not well understood and is based on many
assumptions. For example, if the mechanism of cancer induction in the
control group is assumed to be same as in the treated animals, then the
effects are additive and the dose response curve is linear (i.e. there
is no threshold dose. In other words, the chemical causes cancer at any
dose, however small. This is the basis for the Delaney Clause for food
additives, which prohibits the use any such agent, which at any dose causes
cancer in animals. In pertinent part, it says ". . . no additive shall
be deemed to be safe if it is found to induce cancer when ingested by
man or animal, or if it is found, after tests which are appropriate for
the evaluation of the safety of food additives, to induce cancer in man
or animal. . .." (18) . A compound is considered
"linear" with respect to its carcinogenicity if it is believed to pose
a hazard at any level of exposure, however low. In contrast, non-linearity
refers to a threshold dose, below which the compound poses no such danger
and may be considered safe.
Due to scientific uncertainties associated with the selection of
extrapolation techniques, the safe dose for a given chemical might vary
from agency to agency. A dramatic example, depending on the model used,
linear or non-linear, the magnitude of uncertainty may be a million fold.
(19)
III JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. "Best Available Science"
Federal agencies are required to use the "best available science"
when establishing exposure standards. For example, statutory standards
are that when OSHA chooses to regulate a toxic chemical it must set
Standards which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible,
on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer
material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such employee
has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the
period of his working life. Development of standards under this subsection
shall be based upon research, demonstrations, experiments, and such other
information as may be appropriate. In addition to the attainment of the
highest degree of health and safety protection for the employee, other
considerations shall be the latest available scientific data in the field,
the feasibility of the standards, and experience gained under this and
other health and safety laws. (20)
In a recently decided case (21), the Court
held that EPA had not "considered the best available evidence" in setting
the maximum contaminant level for chloroform under the Safe Drinking Water
Act (SDWA). The SDWA directs EPA to set standards for certain contaminants
found in drinking water. These two standards are (1) the maximum contaminant
level goal (MCLG), which is defined as "the level at which no known or
anticipated adverse effects on the health of persons occur and which allows
for adequate margin of safety." (22); MCLG may be
considered a desirable target concentration and (2) the maximum contaminant
level ("MCL"), which is the enforceable standard based on practical considerations,
which is "as close to the MCLG as is feasible" (23).
Chloroform is a by-product of chlorination of water, which is the most
widely method for ensuring drinking water safety by controlling microbial
pathogens. In July 1994, based on rat studies which showed that chloroform
is a probable human carcinogen, EPA issued a proposed rule setting the
MCLG of chloroform as zero, because the EPA was unable to suggest a threshold
level below which there would be no risk of carcinogenicity. This is based
on EPA's published default method of linear extrapolation of assessing
risk under such circumstances. (24) The default method
is based on the argument that, when there is insufficient data to support
a threshold dose, then linearity may be assumed. Subsequent peer-reviewed
research by a panel of scientific experts organized by the International
Life Sciences Institute and under the auspices of the EPA, concluded in
1998 that chloroform was unlikely to pose any risk of carcinogenicity
below a dose range of 300 ppb (parts per billion). (25).
This lawsuit (26) was filed when EPA ignored this
scientific evidence and published its final rule and again listed chloroform
MCLG as zero. (27). The SWDA requires the EPA Administrator
to use "the best available, peer-reviewed science and supporting studies
conducted in accordance with sound and objective scientific practices."
(28). The Court, based on this statutory mandate, ordered the EPA
final rule to be vacated since it was " arbitrary, capricious and in excess
of statutory authority" since " [b] est scientific evidence indicated
that chloroform posed no risk of cancer below some threshold level…."
(29)
Using the same "best available evidence" standard, the Supreme Court
(30) set aside an OSHA rule lowering benzene exposure levels from
10 ppm to 1 ppm, on the basis that the agency had not shown that such
lowering reduced risk. Benzene is a colorless, aromatic, volatile liquid,
which is an important commercial commodity with an annual production of
11 billion tons in 1976 (31). "The entire population
of the United Sates is exposed to small quantities of benzene, ranging
from a few parts per billion to 0.5 ppm" (32). In
April 1977, the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH),
the research arm of the OSHA, reported to the agency that exposure to
benzene results in a five-fold increase in the incidence of leukemia in
humans. Based on this report, the OSHA issued an emergency order effective
May 21, 1977 lowering the exposure level to 1 ppm. (33).
However, NIOSH made a critical error; the actual benzene concentration
at the site of study, which had been initially reported to be between
zero to 15 ppm, was later admitted by the investigators to be 100 ppm.
A temporary restraining order by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
blocked this order from taking effect. Then, OSHA moved procedurally to
make permanent the aborted 10-ppm standard by the notice and comment method
(34). Interestingly, OSHA sought comments only about the feasibility
of the 1ppm exposure standard. No comments were solicited as to health
risk at exposures of 10 ppm or lower. Commenting on the testimony of OSHA
that it assumes the non-existence of a safe level in the absence of clear
proof of such a level, the Court said " Given OSHA's cancer policy, it
was in fact irrelevant whether there was any evidence at all of a leukemia
risk at 10 ppm" (35). Impartial members of health
science community would applaud the Court's decision on the grounds that
proposals to lower exposure levels of carcinogens should be accompanied
by evidence of benefits of such proposals, which usually have a negative
economic impact.
B. Significant risk/Substantial evidence Standard
Arsenic, a by-product of metal smelting, was found to be carcinogenic
in humans. (36) . Subsequently, OSHA
decided to lower arsenic exposure in the work place from a maximum permissible
level (PEL) of 500 microgram per cubic meter (ug/m3) to 10 ug/m3, which
was challenged (37)on the ground that the agency's
findings were not supported by substantial evidence as required by the
Occupational Health and Safety Act (38). Under this
Act, the agency is required to determine that (1) the current standard
applicable to the toxic agent poses significant health risks and (2) such
risk can be reduced by the proposed change (in this case, the lowering
of arsenic exposure level (39). The Court
in effect had to decide which of conflicting sets of data, offered by
the 2 parties, it should accept. In reviewing conflicting data, the standard
used by the Court usually favors the agency:
[W] here the agency presents scientifically respectable evidence,
which the petitioner can continually dispute with rival, and we will assume
equally respectable evidence, the court must not second guess the particular
way the agency chooses to weigh the conflicting evidence or resolve the
dispute. (40) Apart from the Chevron case
(41) where agencies are allowed wide latitudes in statutory interpretation,
the advantage the agencies have over parties that oppose agency decision
is also noted in the holding that "OSHA is not required to support its
finding . . . with anything approaching scientific certainty.
(42)
The first question for the Court in this case (43)
was to answer: Is the health risk to workers at an arsenic exposure level
of 500 ug/m3 supported by substantial evidence? A related second issue
was: Will the lowering of exposure to 10 ug/m3 "significantly reduce"
that risk The OSHA using mostly epidemiological data from copper smelters
(44)calculated a range of 148-767 excess deaths per 1000 employees
at an exposure level of 500 ug/m3; the corresponding range was 2.2-29
excess deaths at the new statutory standard of 10 ug/m3
(45). The Supreme Court has stated that a "reasonable person might
well consider . . .[even one excess death per 1000] significant . . .."
(46) The petitioner unsuccessfully argued that data used by OSHA were
flawed and, therefore could not be considered "substantial evidence";
they presented conflicting evidence, which found no excess risk of death
at the pre-existing exposure concentration of 500 ug/m3. The Court went
so far as to not only find OSHA's data more reliable (i.e., provided 'substantial
evidence") but also stated "the [petitioner's] data was "critically flawed".
(47)
Ethylene Oxide, a highly reactive gas, is a chemical widely used
in manufacturing, and to smaller extent in sterilization of hospital equipment.
OSHA, after prodding by the Court, subsequent to public interest litigation,
issued a final rule relating to long-term permissible exposure limits
(PEL) and short term exposure limits (STEL) of 1 ppm and 10 ppm, respectively
for ethylene oxide (EtO). (48). The agency however
had reserved judgment on the STEL for EtO, because the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) had objected to the publication of these rules; specifically,
OMB's had concerns, inter alia, related to STEL limit issued for ETO which,
OMB felt was "unsupported by any reasonable risk assessment or inference
from available scientific data" (49). Following reopening
the record for further public comment, OSHA declined, in view of conflicting
opinions presented at the notice and comment stage, not to issue a final
ruling on STEL for EtO. This resulted in several challenges
(50); of pertinence are those from a public interest group, Public
Citizen Health Research Group ("Public Citizen") and an industrial group,
the Association of Ethylene Oxide Users ("AEOU"). Of pertinence to this
discussion is AEOU's contention that epidemiological evidence submitted
by OSHA was "rendered totally valueless by their methodological flaws"
(51). Under the ruling of Benzene case (52),
OSHA had to show first that the pre-existing PEL of 50 ppm posed "significant
risk". In support of this requirement, OSHA submitted results from human
epidemiological and animal (rat and monkey) studies, which showed EtO
exposure is liked to cancer. Though the human studies had certain flaws
admitted by OSHA, the Court, taking into consideration the cumulative
evidence of the results from human and animal studies submitted by OSHA
concluded that the "substantial test was met" because a "reasonable person
could draw from this evidence the conclusion that exposure to EtO presents
a risk of cancer." (53) It also emphasized that this
"Court's role is not review the evidence de novo to arrive at our own
estimate of the risks;" (54).
As the second required step, OSHA provided data on quantification
of risk using a mathematical model which assumes that there is no safe
threshold exposure for EtO which was challenged by AEOU on the highly
specific scientific grounds that (1) OSHA improperly ignored evidence
that shows that EtO does have a safe threshold (2) there are errors in
the extrapolation of breathing rates from rats to humans. Arguments by
AEOU in support of issue (1) involve comments of one participant during
the notice and comment that speculated that that EtO has a safe threshold
dose given the fact that EtO can be detoxified (i.e., metabolized) in
the body. The Court overruled this objection by stating that this participant
had reached "a tepid conclusion that is reasonable to believe that a safe
level of ethylene oxide exits" (55). With respect
to the rat to human conversion of inhalation rates, the basis of the AEOU
challenge was rather weak since it was based on differences in conversion
factors used by different agencies. The Court dismissed this challenge
on the grounds that OSHA's results were not "seriously flawed"
(56)
Public Citizen unsuccessfully challenged OSHA's decision to omit
STEL in the final rule (57) for EtO on basis that
a key scientific (pharmacological) fact used by the agency had not been
shown to be true. OSHA's decided to exclude STEL for EtO on the assumption
that EtO lacked "dose-rate effects" (58). This means
that the effects of EtO are dependent on the dose and not the duration
over which workers are exposed to this dose (i.e. dose-rate). Public Citizen
argued that analyses done by the agency suggested that EtO did have dose-rate
effects. In ruling against Public Citizen, the court said, "These statements
[made by Public Citizen] do not amount to scientific certainty binding
on the agency" (59). While this statement would suggest
that a stronger show of scientific evidence would help the petitioner,
the Court, in the same breath added "We reiterate that the very nature
of scientific on the frontiers of scientific knowledge will rarely allow
a court to compel an agency to adopt a particular hypothesis."
(60)
However, on the issue whether STEL was needed at all, the Court
disagreed with OSHA. The Court however did not accept the agency's argument
that STEL was not needed for EtO since PEL would require that employers
keep levels at 1 ppm. The Court correctly argued that since PEL was based
on an eight-hour average, short term exposures can be higher than 10 ppm
yet meet the PEL limit of 1 ppm. The Court remanded this issue to OSHA
for further study the interrelationship between PEL and STEL.
C. Model Selection: Threshold v. No-threshold
Petitioners argue that OSHA choice of a no threshold (i.e., linear)
model to assess the risk of arsenic exposure to workers in smelters was
not based on scientific reasoning but by administrative fiat
(61). In addition, they proposed a non-linear or threshold model to
quantify carcinogenic risk of arsenic (62). The Court
dismissed the arguments on the basis that the expert for OSHA had analyzed
the epidemiological data by both linear and non-linear models and found
that a linear model better described the data. (63).
In the absence of a details of data provided by each party, independent
analysis of the scientific merits of the Court's holding is difficult.
It appears from many decisions of the Court that it behooves parties wishing
to challenge administrative agencies to fully understand the scientific
methods and standards used by them as part of the decision making process
to filing suit.
D. Opinion of scientists is not scientific evidence
In January 1991, EPA issued the final rule for MCGL and
MCL for thirty-eight organic and inorganic chemicals (64).
This case involves 4 of these chemicals, 1,2 dibromo-3-chloropropane ("DBCP"),
ethylene dibromide ("EDB") tetracholroethylene ("perc') and polychlorinated
biphenyls ('PCBs") for each of which EPA set MCLG of zero.
The challengers' (65) first argument, a general
one, which applies to all four chemicals, is that EPA, arbitrarily and
capriciously failed to consider two available pieces of scientific evidence
in proposing the final rule (66). This evidence consisted
of two items: (1) a short (three- page) letter to the editor by two scientists
(67), which proposed that "low doses of carcinogens appear to be .
. .less hazardous than is generally thought" (68)
and (2) a declaration by another scientist who "pointed out the difficulties
inherent in drawing conclusions about humans from studies conducted in
animals" (69). The Court held that EPA gave this
"new evidence" adequate attention, since neither of these documents contained
any statistical analysis of available data nor pointed out weaknesses
of methods and data generally relied upon by the scientific community.
In other words, the Court concluded that the petitioner's "new data" were
mere opinions of a few scientists and did not constitute scientific data.
This author would agree that the court's decision was well reasoned and
would also find much support in the scientific community.
E. Adequate evidence is needed
Petitioners argued that EPA had not adequately explained reasons
for its action in setting the MCLG and MCL for the pesticide 1,2 dibromo-3-chloropropane
("DBCP") at zero and 0.0002 mg/l, respectively. (70)
In addition, the petitioners claimed that EPA had improperly rejected
data submitted by them. Here, the petitioners had submitted two epidemiological
studies during the comment phase which provided epidemiological data obtained
from workers exposed to DBCP, primarily through inhalation in the workplace;
the petitioners also stated that "do [] not show any statistically significant
increase in either overall cancer rates of any specific cancer type."
(71). The EPA in turn argued that they rejected
the petitioner's epidemiological date based on its (EPA's) assessment
that the two-year follow up time was inadequate and the study lacked adequate
statistical power (one factor which reduces statistical such power is
the use of an inadequate number of subjects in the study). Without access
to all the data, it is not possible to critically evaluate EPA's decision
from a scientific point of view. However, a two-year follow up is indeed
very short, given the latency period (interval between exposure to development
of cancer) can be as long as 40 years (72). The Court
correctly concluded that the EPA had satisfactorily explained the reasons
for rejecting petitioner's data and met the standard of "satisfactory
explanation" required in rule making (73).
In the same case (74), the Court sustained
EPA's decision to reject petitioners epidemiological data on ethylene
dibromide, a pesticide (banned for this use by the EPA in 1983) and a
gasoline additive (under EPA regulation), based on EPA's assessment that
(1) the study used a small population size (there were 156 subjects in
this study) (2) exposure rates were poorly characterized and (3) mortality
studies in workers are inconclusive with respect to cancer risk.
Another criticism the EPA had for the two studies submitted by the
petitioner involved differences in the route of administration
(75). Since these epidemiological studies were obtained based on human
exposure via inhalation, EPA argued, "toxicity may depend on dosing route
. . .." (76). The EPA's argument, though accepted
by the Court, was speculative because it appears that data on body burdens
(amount of chemical entering the body) were not available. Firstly, the
carcinogenicity of a chemical is independent of the route by which it
enters the body. Of more importance is the amount of chemical that enters
the body, and not the route per se. On a linear model, any exposure can
cause cancer (though the probability decreases as the dose decreases);
while in a non-linear model, cancer is caused only when exposure exceeds
the threshold dose. In either case, pharmacokinetic assessment of body
burdens (e.g., blood concentrations) of a chemical is needed to properly
compare studies using two different routes (in this example, inhalation
via oral).
In July 1997, EPA issued final rules for primary and secondary standards
for ozone (77). Primary standard refers to a concentration
level "requisite to protect public health" with an adequate margin of
safety and a secondary standard a level "requisite to protect the public
welfare. (78) Challengers to these standards complained
that the EPA had ignored data presented by them on health benefits of
troposphere ozone, such as protection shield against cataracts and skin
cancers caused by the sun's ultraviolet rays (79).
The criteria to be used by the EPA for each pollutant under the Clean
Air Act (80) are to "reflect the latest scientific
knowledge useful in indicating the kind and extent of all identifiable
effects on public health or welfare which may be expected from the presence
of such pollutant in the ambient air, in varying effects. In accepting
the petitioner's complaint, the Court remanded the ruling for further
consideration by EPA on the beneficial effects of troposphere ozone.
F. Animal data is acceptable to decide human carcinogenicity
The petitioner's argued that EPA had relied (presumably inappropriately)
on data from animal studies where they had used "extremely high doses",
(81). This is one of the major scientific criticisms of animal studies
where high doses are often used to test for carcinogenicity. It is therefore
argued in some circles that toxicity of chemicals are overestimated and
such reports needlessly frighten the public, resulting in legislative
action (or reaction) resulting in a "vicious cycle" (82),
as one author, now a Supreme Court justice characterized this sequence
of events. Further, the petitioners contend that tumors "tended to develop
at the site of contact (83), suggesting that the
chemical is safe when ingested (i.e., not a systemic toxin). EPA countered
that they had used two rodent species (rats and mice) and three exposure
routes (oral, inhalation and dermal) to determine that DBCP, a known carcinogen
produced tumors at both local and distant sites. The court ruled that
the EPA had "sufficiently justified its reliance on animal studies"
(84). Based on the available of EPA's data, it appears that the petitioners
had a weak case from a scientific point of view. Perhaps it was for tactical
reasons that such a suit was filed, since it is difficult how the petitioners'
scientific experts could have missed EPA's animal data.
G. Validity of the method used for chemical analysis
In one case (85), the petitioners argued that
the chemical method used for analysis of PCBs in water samples was adopted
without the required notice and comment (86). EPA
had admitted that the method used at the proposed rule stage had been
verified in only one laboratory (87). The method
(Method 508 A) involves the use of the well-established analytical technique
called gas chromatography (88), which is widely used
by scientists to measure compounds such as PCBs at low (e.g. parts per
million) concentrations. From a scientific standpoint, the petitioner's
argument is weak, because when a relatively simple method is properly
validated, even if only in one laboratory, other laboratories should be
able to confirm the original work. In fact, the SDWA only requires that
the EPA " use data collected by accepted methods or best available methods
(if the reliability of the method and the nature of the decision justifies
use of the data). (89) Before promulgating the final
rule, the EPA confirmed the reliability of Method 508 A by showing that
results obtained with this method was consistent with those obtained by
several private laboratories (Water Studies 23-25). The Court, using these
supporting scientific data and other past regulatory holdings
(90), agreed that EPA adequately validated Method 508 A and denied
the petitioners request that the case be remanded so that they may submit
criticisms of the Water Studies 23-254. From a scientist's perspective,
the holding is sound because the petitioners had a chance to comment on
the possible weaknesses of method 508 A and could have suggested improvements
during the notice and comment phase.
IV. SOLUTIONS FOR EFFECTIVE RISK ASSESSMENT
Many feel that we live in an over regulated society. Further, it
also widely believed that the cost to benefit ratio is very high. For
example, it has been estimated that regulation of benzene and coke by-product
recovery plants cost over $200 million but only saves 3 to 4 lives; in
another case regulatory costs has been estimated to about $180 million
to save one statistical life (91). Morally and ethically
it is understandably offensive to put a price tag on human life. Perhaps,
such cost estimates may be found conscionable if it is noted that this
money can be used for helping other lives, such as funding programs to
reduce hunger, or to improve nourishment for children in the US or in
the world at large.
In searching for solution, one has to first understand dynamics
of regulatory law making. Such understanding will help identify areas
to focus on in this search. The main players that drive the regulatory
engine are the Congress, the courts and regulatory agencies. Based on
legitimate or perceived public health concerns, scientific studies are
conducted by the regulatory agencies, as their mandates require them to
do, to explore the validity of these concerns. If found necessary, the
agencies promulgate new rules or modify them. Challenges to these rules,
if they cannot be resolved at the agency level, end up in our courts,
which have to resolve these technically very complex disputes. Based on
the case law discussed (see supra), it has clear that agency decisions
are given much deference by the courts. It is only on rare occasions that
an agency loses in court. Perhaps, this is the reason it has been stated
that answers to the problem of over regulation is unlikely to be found
in our court system (92). However, establishment
of special court, as with patent litigation, that deals exclusively with
cases connected with environmental and workplace health hazards is one
solution. Such a court must have its team of independent health scientists
and economists to provide it with a critical analysis of the scientific
issues and a cost/benefit analysis of the regulation in dispute. The advantages
of such a court are: (1) it would be more willing to challenge agency
decisions on scientific/ technical and economic grounds; this should help
the quality of rule making and (2) over time, such a court can be expected
to develop insights into the complicated nature of risk assessment; such
knowledge should be a driving force towards a more uniform interagency
policy of regulating hazardous substances, either in the environment or
workplace.
It has been opined that changes in the regulatory agencies might
be helpful (93). The present structure has been stated
to suffer from "[t] unnel vision, a classic administrative disease, [which]
arises when an agency so organizes or subdivides its tasks that each employee's
individual conscientious performance effectively carries a single-minded
pursuit of a single goal too the point where it brings about more harm
than good". (94) As a consequence, one former EPA
administrator noted is that while most (about 95%) of the toxic material
could be removed from waste sites in a few months, years are spent trying
to clean up the remainder (95). The author recounts
one of his own experience where the "cost of cleaning up the last bit
[] cost about $9.3 million" (96). In effect, this
money was spent " to protect non-existent dirt-eating children"
(97). Changes, proposed to prevent such outcomes are establishment
of a centralized agency with civil servants with wider expertise in such
areas as "health and environmental agencies, Congress and OMB"
(98). This agency will have five features (1) a mission of building
a coherent risk-regulating system (a) interagency jurisdiction, (3) political
insulation (4) prestige and (5) authority. (99) The
Science Advisory Board of the EPA has been given as a model to develop
this centralized agency. The need for more science in the courtroom was
also emphasized in the silicone breast implant settlement
(100). A critic of such a "super agency", might object that it is
politically unacceptable and undemocratic, elitist, ineffective, impractical
(101).
In conclusion, discussions are urgently needed in the legal community
on the use and misuse of science in risk assessment . It is hoped that
such discussions would lead to more efficient risk assessment regulation
and enforcement, which have significant health and economic implications
for society.
1. 49 Fed. Reg. at 25737 (quoting from Public Citizen
Health Research Group v. Tyson 796 F. 2d at 1483)
2. National Research Council. Pharmacokinetics. p.
xi (quoting Carl F. Cranor, Regulating Toxic Substances (1993), at 118)
3. 48 Fed. Reg. at 1875
4. Stedman's Medical Dictionary, 23rd Edition, page
470-71
5. Id at 1461
6. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,
Identifying and Regulating Carcinogens (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1987, p.
39 (quoting Carl F. Cranor, Regulating Toxic Substances (1993) at p.17)
7. See generally Carl F. Cranor, Regulating Toxic
Substances (1993)
8. Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Amer. Petroleum
Institute 448 U.S. 607, 635
9. Carl F. Cranor, Regulating Toxic Substances (1993),
at p. 30
10. Researchers wanting to compare human data with
animal data could find such data for 23 chemicals. Bruce C. Allen, Kenneth
S. Crump and Annette M. Shipp, " Correlations Between Carcinogenic Potency
of Chemicals in Animals and Humans," Risk Analysis December 1988, pp.
531-44 (Carl F. Cranor, Regulating Toxic Substances (1993), at p. 16
11. Carl F. Cranor, Regulating Toxic Substances (1993)
at p. 30
12. Id.
13. Id. p.12-15.
14. U.S. Interagency Staff Group on Carcinogens,
"Chemical Carcinogens: A Review of the Science and Its associated Principles,"
Environmental Health Perspectives 67, 1986: 274 (quoting Carl F. Cranor,
Regulating Toxic Substances (1993), at 16).
15. Carl F. Cranor, Regulating Toxic Substances (1993),
at 16
16. Id
17. Id. at 17
18. 21 USC sec. 348 (c) (3)(a).]
19. From Cranor "An overview of risk Assessment,"
in Proceedings: Pesticides and other Toxics: Assessing Their Risks, ed.
J. White (Riverside: University of California, College of Natural and
Agricultural Sciences, 1990, page 83 (quoting Carl F. Cranor, Regulating
Toxic Substances (1993), Appendix A)
20. 29 U.S.C sec. 655 (b) (5)(1982)
21. Chlorine Chemistry Council v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 5825 (D.C. Cir, 2000)
22. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(4) A
23. Id. § 300g-1(b)(4)(B)
24. 61 Fed. Reg. 17960, 17968/3
25. 63 Fed. Reg. 15674 (1998)
26. Chlorine Chemistry Council v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 5825
27. 63 Fed. Reg. at 68398/3
28. 42 U.S.C. sec. 300g-1(b)(3)(A)
29. Chlorine Chemistry Council v. Environmental Protection
Agency
30. Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607
31. Id at 615
32. Id
33. 42 Fed. Reg. 22516 (1977)
34. Id at 27452
35. Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 at 625
36. 40 Fed. Reg. 3392.
37. ASARCO v. OSHA 746 F.2d 483,
38. 29 U.S.C. sec 655(f)
39. Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Amer.
Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 at 625
40. ASARCO v. OSHA 746 F.2d 483 at 491 (quoting United
Steelworkers of America v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189 (DC Cir, 1980)
41. Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council
467, U.S. 837
42. Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Amer.
Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 at 656
43. ASARCO v. OSHA 746 F.2d 483
44. 48 Fed. Reg. 1864, part III
45. 48 Fed. Reg. at 1866
46. Industrial Union Dept. v. Amer. Petroleum Inst.
448 U.S. 607, 655
47. ASARCO v. OSHA 746 F. 2d at 491
48. 49 Fed. Reg. 25737
49. Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson
796 F. 2d 1479, 1483 (D.C., Cir., 1986)
50. Id.
51. Id at 1487
52. Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Amer.
Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 at 625
53. Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson
796 F. 2d 1489
54. Id
55. Id at 1499
56. Id at 1502
57. 49 Fed. Reg. 25734, (1984)
58. Public Citizen Health Research Group at 1505.
59. Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson
796 F. 2d at 1505
60. Id
61. ASARCO v. OSHA 746 F.2d at 492
62. Id
63. Id. at 493
64. 56 Fed. Reg. 3, 526 (1991)
65. Intl. Fabricare Inst. v. US EPA 972 F. 2d 384
(D.C. Cir., 1992)
66. Id at 391
67. Bruce N. Ames and Lois Swirsky Gold, Pesticide,
Risk, and Applesauce 244 Science 755 (May 19, 1989) (quoting Intl. Fabricare
v. US EPA at p. 391)
68. Intl. Fabricare v. US EPA at p. 391
69. Id
70. Intl. Fabricare v. US EPA
71. Id at 393
72. L. Tomatis, "Environmental Cancer Risk Factors:
A Review," Acta Oncologica 27 (1988): 465-472 (quoting Carl F. Cranor,
Regulating Toxic Substances (1993), at page 16)
73. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States,
Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Co., 463 U.S. 29
74. Intl. Fabricare v. US EPA at 394
75. Intl. Fabricare v. US EPA
76. Id at 393
77. 62 Fed. Reg. 38856
78. Id at sec. 7409 (b)
79. American Trucking v. United States Environmental
Protection Agency, 175 F. 3d 1027
80. 42 U.S.C. sec. 7409 b (1) and (2)
81. Intl. Fabricare v. US EPA Id at 393
82. S. Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Cycle, 1993.
83. Intl. Fabricare v. US EPA at 39?
84. Intl. Fabricare v. US EPA Id at 393
85. Intl. Fabricare Inst. v. US EPA at 398-399
86. Final Rule, 56 Fed Reg. at 3551
87. Proposed Rule Fed. Reg. at 22,099-100
88. Id.
89. 42 USC sec 300g-1 (3)(A)
90. Community Nutrition Inst. V. Block, 749 F. 2d
50, 57-58 (D.C. Cir., 1984)
91. Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Cycle (1989)
92. Id at 59
93. Id at 59
94. Id at 11
95. Id
96. Id at 12
97. Id
98. Id at 59
99. Id at 60
100. Marcia Angell, Science on Trial (1997)
101. Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Cycle
(1989) at 72-70.
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